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South African Political Parties Face the World in an Election Year - 2019: Reflecting on Manifestos and their take on Foreign Policy

Lukhona Mnguni
PhD Candidate and Researcher, Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit, University of KwaZulu Natal (UKZN)
“The end of the Cold War has created a new global situation in which our young democracy must find its feet. The new world order, if it exists, is fraught with uncertainties and insecurities. *Ideological conflict has to a large extent been replaced by economic competition, the rules of which have not yet been fully agreed upon. The ground beneath our feet is not firm: It is volatile and unpredictable.*”

– Former Minister Alfred Nzo, September 1995

**Overview**

This occasional paper was written in preparation of an inter-political party public dialogue entitled ‘*African Political Parties Face the World in an Election Year: A Foreign Policy Panel Discussion*’, hosted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung South African together with the University of KwaZulu-Natal's International and Public Affairs cluster in the School of Social Sciences on the 19th March 2019, Garden Court Marine Parade Hotel’ in Durban. Foreign policy usually falls through the cracks during the electioneering period, yet it is important to have an understanding of how political parties imagine the place of South Africa in the world. This panel discussion was an opportunity for South African youth to engage with political party officials on foreign policy issues, during a capacity-building workshop called “*The Evolving Global Order: What’s at Stake for Africa?*”. The African National Congress, the Democratic Alliance and the Inkatha Freedom Party were represented. The Economic Freedom Fighters was invited but did not have a representative.

**Introduction**

This year South Africa celebrates 25 years of its democratic breakthrough. It is a significant milestone as the country remains fairly stable. There are obvious social, political and economic strains that threaten the cohesiveness of the country and its ability to achieve objectives for nation-building with the view of delivering social justice for all its citizens. South Africa remains a country with the highest inequality in the world and economic growth and productivity has been low, if not stagnant. Politically the citizens are appearing to be further alienated from the political landscape and its processes. This is evident in the decreasing registration rate among the voter-aged
population. In 2014 this rate was at 80.5% and for the upcoming elections for 2019, following the final registration weekend campaign, the registration rate stood at 74.5% with about 9.2 million eligible voters not registered at all. The Independent Electoral Commission indicated that of these non-registered citizens, about six million (±61%) are youth below the age of 30. The official figure of unregistered eligible voters hovers around 9.6 million. Socially, there is a growing visible presence of violence that targets both young and old in equal measure, with the scourge of gender-based violence a persistent concern. Communities, institutions of higher education and at times work places continue to experience protests that easily show a penchant for violence.

These internal challenges South Africa experiences constrain the country’s ability to have space to focus on its foreign policy, due to domestic demands. The challenges faced by the power utility, ESKOM, compound the problem as they make the country less attractive to those global players with an appetite for economic investment. Currently, as South Africa heads to the 6th democratic general elections, the country is struggling with growing public debt. This debt could undermine the country’s ability to champion a foreign policy agenda free of compromise. This is evident in how investments are welcome from a country like Saudi Arabia, not known for championing human rights and respecting institutions such as the media. This almost appears as creeping desperation for South Africa to stay afloat economically as the government’s investment drive seeks to gain momentum. The threat of too much public debt owed to foreign creditors and over reliance on foreign investments is that over time it could weaken a country’s claim to its sovereignty. This is particularly true of situations that lead to credit ratings downgrades and interventions by the IMF on fiscal and monetary policies which further constrains a country’s ability to dispense public goods for its citizens.

Citizens expecting solutions to their immediate domestic challenges can easily view government’s focus on international relations as pursuing unnecessary action. The dictum “charity begins at home” often comes to mind when citizens begin to feel that investment on international relations is wasteful expenditure with little to no returns. This is further exacerbated by the legitimacy of some global forums being questioned. This, in part, was crystallised when the Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. of the Philippines declined to attend the World Economic Forum of 2019. His reason was that “we [the Philippines] don’t count there. Waste of money to listen to rich people basically babble.” This means; for countries to participate fully in international relations, the institutions and various fora where multilateral affairs are held must enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of those who are onlookers to their proceedings.
South Africa in the World

Since returning to the family of nations in 1994, South Africa has been trusted with significant responsibilities. The country is now serving its third two-year term tenure at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent seat-holder.

There are notable South Africans who have also been entrusted with significant responsibilities by the international community in various capacities. These include Dr. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka who is the current Executive Director at the United Nations Women, Judge Navi Pillay who was the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2008-2014), Dr. Mamphela Ramphele who became the managing director at the World Bank in 2000, Dr. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi who became the democratic governance director in the United Nations Development Programme’s Bureau for Development Policy in 2009, Judge Richard Goldstone who has become a leading international jurist in multiple roles and diverse communities of crises, and former president Thabo Mbeki being tasked to chair the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) which led to the formation of South Sudan on 9 July 2011. These are but a limited list of notable contributions by various individuals who hail from South Africa.

The country has co-chaired various panels and commissions of the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation and others. The country has played host to important fora, notably the COP 17 – the 17th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2011. This was just over a year following the country’s hosting of the 2010 Soccer World Cup, the first of its kind in African soil. COP 17 delivered what many heralded as “the Durban breakthrough” on climate change following intense negotiations that nearly collapsed without resolution, saved by persistent stewardship of the hosts – the South African government. This positioned South Africa as an important role-player in the global efforts to fight global warming and the resultant climate change. It was COP 17 that set the stage for the now in place Paris Agreement on climate change adopted in 2015 during COP 21 and ratified in 2016.

Grobbelaar and Chen (2014) highlight that South Africa has, since 1994, played a less hegemonic role in the African continent. South Africa has, in its regional endeavours, been guided by a broad “rubric of peace-building, conflict mediation, post-conflict reconstruction and regional stabilization” (Grobbelaar & Chen, 2014). This is because
of a belief stated by then deputy president Thabo Mbeki in his address to South African ambassadors, in September 1995, that:

“There are also expectations from Africa that South Africa should make a significant contribution towards peace and development in the continent. South Africa’s problems cannot be worse than those experienced by other African countries. Despite our own limitations and problems, it is our objective to make a significant contribution to ensuring peace, democracy, respect for human rights and sustained development. These principles are fundamental to our foreign policy.”

South Africa for some time lived by these principles. The country played a leading role alongside Nigeria and Senegal, in the main, towards the reformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to become the African Union (AU) in July 2002 with a more robust Constitutive Act that heralded a new era in Africa’s attempts to achieve peace and security for the realisation of development and people’s human rights. In these endeavours South Africa relied on its moral stature bestowed upon it by the nature of its transition from apartheid rule to democratic governance. The negotiation and reconciliation model has been at the forefront of South Africa’s engagement with other countries, particularly on the African continent.

The role played by South Africa in global affairs has not been without controversy. Some of those controversies, subject to debate, include “South Africa’s controversial tenure on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the ongoing Dalai Lama visa debacles, the misguided and divisive campaign to win the chair of the AU’s Commission, and the tragic military misadventure in the Central African Republic” (Le Pere, 2014:32). Other misadventures include South Africa being implicated in the capture and murder of Muammar Gaddafi. South Africa, along with two other African countries (Gabon and Nigeria) voted for the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1973 that enforced a no-fly zone on Libya in March 2011. This of course became a pretext for setting apace the hunt for Gaddafi and when South Africa tried to intervene when the crisis heightened, it was a little too late.

South Africa’s foreign policy is currently framed through the White Paper of 2011 that introduces the concept, Diplomacy of Ubuntu. This is the outlook the country adopts as its approach to diplomacy and also to shape its “vision of a better world for all” (2011:4). Central to this is that “national security would therefore depend on the centrality of human security as a universal goal, based on the principle of Batho Pele (putting people first)” (ibid.).
2019 Political Party Manifestos on Foreign Policy

Political parties use manifestos to craft and communicate their promises to the electorate. A fair reading and summary of each of their manifests in preparation for the panel discussion was necessary. The summary is not exhaustive, it simply highlights the important emerging areas of focus. The Inkatha Freedom Party last had a section on foreign policy in their 2009 manifesto. In the recent manifestos (2014 and 2019) the party has not communicated its stance and priorities for foreign policy. This indicates one of two things. Either the party has become lethargic in its pursuit for political power that manifestos are simply compliance with the rules of the game or given the changing narratives at the global level the party is still rethinking and reimagining its allies and allegiances through the globe. Therefore, this summary takes into account the manifestos of the ANC, DA and the EFF.

This paper will look at a few core areas of foreign policy and compare the positions of the ANC, DA and EFF on these issues. The core areas are global security and good governance, Israel / Palestine and xenophobia.

Global Security and Good Governance
The ANC is interested in pursuing a conciliatory foreign policy, emphasizing the need to build a world “in which there is respect for the right to national sovereignty of all nations, the pursuit of world peace and friendship, not wars”. The ANC further commits to a better Africa “free from the shackles of under-development and the legacy of colonialism”. At a global level the ANC subscribes to “progressive internationalism and solidarity around the world”. In its commitment to action, the organization focuses on Africa, especially the creation of intra-Africa trade, advancing the continent’s Agenda 2063 and promoting “great peace, security and stability in SADC” as well as other places such as the DRC and South Sudan. The ANC, taking advantage of South Africa’s third term in the UNSC for 2019-2020, committed to find resources to dedicate to the country’s global and continental responsibilities. These include commitments on climate change as per the Paris Agreement. It stands to be seen whether or not the Paris Agreement will be implemented, even here in South Africa. Political parties have great pressure to bring about economic stimulation through industrialisation, proposing various mechanisms to establish special economic zones. These can be – if not well envisioned – a threat to the environment.

There is however nothing on the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the ANC manifesto. In recent years the party and its government have been at the forefront of
criticizing the ICC and even moving the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act Repeal Bill in Parliament in attempts to sever ties with obligations to the ICC. The silence on this in its manifesto might be owing to the new leadership under Ramaphosa being more cautious and attempting to repair damages of the past.

The DA subscribes to a “human-rights based foreign policy” centered on championing the ethos of the South African constitution and its commendable human rights agenda. The DA’s foreign policy will consider mostly the “country’s economic and security interests”. In what appears to be lesser emphasis on the sovereignty of other states, the DA makes a bold commitment to “We will seek to build the pillars of a just society everywhere – to promote democratic governments and states characterised by accountable institutions, independent judiciaries, free media and vibrant civil societies”. There is recognition that South Africa has an active role in bringing about peace and security to the world through peacekeeping initiatives right through to post conflict recovery involvement. The DA also sees foreign policy as significant in catalysing new arrangements for trade, to open up new markets for South Africa in the BRICS bloc, European Union and elsewhere; especially regional integration within SADC.

The DA sees the staffing of diplomatic missions across the world with professional and well-trained staff as critical in achieving our goals to increase trade, investment and tourism. This call is probably fuelled by revelations in recent years of how some ambassadors have been found wanting in their dishonesty. Such as Mohau Pheko who was found guilty of fraudulently claiming to have a doctoral degree. This led to her stepping down in 2015. Obed Mlaba, High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, was recalled in 2017 after being exposed to have “failed his security clearance and was running the high commission “like a spaza shop””. The DA emphatically backs multilateralism and sustenance of a rules-based international system, with a need for reform in some institutions. The party reiterated its support for the ICC.

It is not surprising, within its ideological orientation, that the EFF has a more radical approach to its foreign policy agenda. The West is characterised as exerting “global imperialist dominance” that should be ended. This makes the EFF’s approach focus on building relations with “progressive nations in Latin America, Asia and the African continent”. In the African continent, Botswana is to be isolated by the entire continent because the country “has been home to an imperialist military”. Furthermore, there should be a fight for internal reforms in Botswana that should involve the people of
Botswana. The nature of the internal reforms is not stated. This position is unsurprising as it formed part of the reasons that led to Julius Malema and some in the ANC Youth League being hauled before a disciplinary hearing that eventually got them expelled and suspended respectively. That moment led to the formation of the EFF.

The EFF seeks to build mutually beneficial “sustainable and balanced relations” with fellow BRICS countries, while committing to assist Lesotho and Zimbabwe to realise their full potential. While solidarity is pledged to the people of Western Sahara in their pursuit for political independence, a little more is promised to the people of Swaziland – the political and economic isolation of the Monarchy until internal reforms to democratise Swaziland have been realised. Cuba features as one of the states the EFF will extend its diplomatic friendship towards. Radical transformation of multilateral institutions such as the UNSC and the ICC to be able to prosecute “war lords such as Tony Blair and George Bush” are part of the EFF’s foreign policy approach. The AU’s Agenda 2063 would also face radical transformation under the EFF to become Agenda 2038 by which year the African economy is expected to resemble China’s modern economy while “guaranteeing basic democratic freedoms”. Lastly, the EFF promises to fight for a borderless Africa with a single currency with Ki-Swahila becoming a compulsory language of communication across the continent.

**Israel and Palestine**

Curiously on its manifesto, the ANC has nothing on Israel-Palestine conflict yet at its National Conference held at Nasrec in December 2017 a resolution to downgrade the South African embassy to a liaison office in Israel was adopted. The ANC has always affirmed its political solidarity to the people of Palestine. To its credit, the ANC led government did recall South Africa’s ambassador on the 14 May 2018 following what government labelled as “the latest act of violent aggression carried out by Israeli armed forces along the Gaza border, which has led to the deaths of over 40 civilians”\(\text{viii}\). In April 2019 the South African Department of: International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) indicated that the ambassador to Israel would not be replaced and plans to downgrade the embassy will continue.

This attracted criticism from Mmusi Maimane, the leader of the official opposition, the DA. Maimane believed that “it is not the way we must operate in the diplomatic world”\(\text{ix}\). Maimane’s protestation came across as the DA indicating its seriousness in how it views the Israel-Palestine conflict. Yet, in the party’s own manifesto there is no mention of the conflict and how it ought to be resolved. The ANC had last given strong priority in its manifesto to this conflict in 2009 wherein the party supported a two-state
solution with both Israel and Palestine to be allowed to become strong and independent sovereign countries, using the 1967 borders. But in 2019 similar articulation, to what has become a worsening crisis, is not seen.

A country that features prominently in the EFF’s list of nations to be isolated is Israel, with a promise that an EFF government would “implement incremental boycotts, disinvestment and sanctions against the apartheid state of Israel as a concrete form of solidarity with the Palestinians....”

**Xenophobia**

The political parties have striking similarities and points of divergence on foreign policy. In the last 25 years their election manifests have covered foreign policy with varied consistency and depth. The ANC seems to have been the most consistent party in articulating its foreign policy agenda. The parties seem to present their concerns on xenophobia in less obvious terms and focusing on border control. In 2009, the IFP had identified the problem of xenophobia as one needing attending. The party viewed the problem as “aggravated by the fact that we have a porous border resulting in an influx of too many illegal immigrants”. In the same year, the ANC viewed the consciousness levels of South Africans as problematic in driving xenophobic attacks, hence calls to “Conduct awareness campaigns among our people to prevent incidents of xenophobia...” These were intended to be done, in part, to acknowledge “the contribution that foreign nationals make to our economy”. The Democratic Alliance did not utter the word xenophobia in its 2009 manifesto. It was important for parties to reflect on xenophobia in 2009 given how widespread xenophobic attacks were in 2008 in the country.

In 2019, following various incidents of xenophobic violence, the parties have felt it necessary to comment on the question of borders and enterprise competition at a local level as a key area of weakness. The ANC promises to protect locals participating in the local (village and township) economy by expanding “the campaign to stop illegal trading in townships and villages, much of which is conducted by foreign nationals...” This seems a strong departure from the party’s position in 2009 where it called for a need for South Africans to acknowledge the contribution of foreign nationals in the economy. The DA mentions the word “borders” 16 times in its 2019 manifesto. There is great focus on this as the phrase “securing our borders” has even made it to electioneering posters of the party. The DA identifies two problems caused by undocumented migration, which the party charges is caused by a “complete lack of security and lawful migration at our borders”. The first problem is that unlawful and
undocumented migration makes it impossible for government to plan service delivery as the number of people in the country is unknown. The second problem, and most compelling for the party, is that “state resources have to stretch further which can breed resentment among South Africans who have been deprived for a very long time”. The party views the latter reality as a significant contributor in creating significant tensions in communities as the competition for scarce resources, especially by those deprived and poor members of our society continues.

The EFF enters the xenophobic attacks and its causes from its pan-Africanist perspective. The party views borders as a chronic impediment to Africa’s development in general, hence the party promises that an EFF government “will fight for a borderless Africa and a single currency in the medium to long term”. This idea probably needs more grappling with and to be unpacked as “a borderless Africa” could unwittingly create uncontrollable migration to economically vibrant regions in the continent and thus breeding greater enterprise competition and conflict in communities.

**Contested Institutional Ties and Relations in Foreign Policy**

There are a number of developments in international relations that should concern South Africa. The first is the rise in new forms of nationalism that are radicalising certain societies, especially in the ‘developed world’. Trade tensions are beginning to arise differently due to these new forms of nationalism. BREXIT is an offshoot of nationalism that will inadvertently reconfigure trade relations not only between the European Union (EU) and Britain but with the rest of the world given that Britain will have to pursue her trade agenda outside the protections and immunities of the EU. The US-China standoff dubbed a “trade war” was initiated by US President Donald Trump who believed the trade agreements between the two parties disproportionately favour China. This is in keeping with Trump’s “America First” narrative, almost creating a zero-sum game to how the US will be engaging with the rest of the world. This trade war’s consequences are its massive effects on developing countries that form part of the world’s emerging markets. It was this reality that led the IMF to caution that a full-blown war would “weaken the global economy”. In South African circles this “trade war” was discussed superficially with little effort made to educate the citizens on its potential impact to the global south generally and South Africa in particular. This is because more often than not, even in the media spaces, foreign policy is discussed when a need arises to respond to global developments and not out of habit to stay abreast with life across the world. Political parties and media practitioners should do more to centre foreign policy discussions for the benefit of the South African citizenry.
The second is the growing lack of confidence in multilateral institutions, made worse by the renewed nationalism across the globe, which makes countries adopt a more anarchist approach to international relations by withdrawing support and participation in some of the multilateral institutions. This poses a challenge for South Africa as it might need to find new allies as relations strain. For example, the US government under Donald Trump’s administration has reviewed and cut-back on a number of multilateral agreements. South Africa has had challenges in its relationship with the US but they appear at an all-time low with no US ambassador to South Africa, two years later since Trump came into power. The US-South Africa relationship is important, in particular when it comes to discussing areas of common interest in the development of the African continent given the strategic positioning of both countries in matters of peace, security and development in Africa. In this instance, countries become inward looking in solving their domestic challenges and those with enough power and resources could easily be more aggressive when negotiating with countries of lesser powers. This has potential to lead to new forms of economic domination that will make the achievement of the global commitment to Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development Goals almost impossible, given that these are premised on a greater need for international cooperation and collaboration in solving today’s problems of the world. These multilateral institutions include the World Trade Organisation (WTO), deemed as a failure by the IFP in its 2009 manifesto. The WTO started the Doha Round of negotiations in 2001 in order “to achieve major reform of the international trading system through the introduction of lower trade barriers and revised trade rules”\textsuperscript{xix}. Since 2001 the Doha Round has not been concluded and since its virtual collapse in 2008 there has been no success in reviving it. This means the expressed ambitions to “lower trade barriers”, especially for developing countries, have not been realised.

The third is an absent strategic centre for the arbitration of international law in order to achieve peace and security, the mandate of the United Nations prescribed in its UN Charter. The UN fulfils this mandate by delegating authority to the 15-member (5 permanent seats and 10 non-permanent rotating seats) UNSC. This makes the UNSC the most powerful institution in the global peace and security architecture. South Africa keeps repeating calls for reformation of the UNSC because of the inequitable representation of regions (particularly the global south) in the permanent seat holders, which effectively juniorises those regions without representation. However, calls made by South Africa (through the ANC) in particular are less about reform and more about inclusion. South Africa wishes for a permanent seat in the UNSC with veto powers. The five permanent seat holders (including two fellow BRICS countries – China
and Russia) are reluctant to accept any alteration of the status quo. Given the powerful role of the UNSC and its ability to tamper with matters before the ICC, prosecution of leaders from the five-permanent seat–holders, which include the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom, will always remain an elusive and hollow pursuit. This has made allegiance to the ICC be viewed with scepticism by many African countries that feel the court exists to prosecute only those who hail from less powerful countries. The truth is that the global peace and security architecture is deformed by the disproportionate power held by the five-permanent seat–holders at the UNSC.

**Conclusion**

There appears to be some disjuncture between what political parties say in their public performance and rhetoric compared to the inconsistent effort they put in their manifestos when articulating foreign policy. This makes it difficult for voters to trust whether the performed political speech indicates a party’s priorities when said speech is not part of the policy promises published for voters to interact with. This might also be indicative of some political parties not taking the manifestos as seriously as they should in their electioneering process. It is quite glaring that the IFP has not stated its foreign policy positions in the last two elections. Those who imagine themselves in government should be aware that South Africa continues to exist with a responsibility to champion the interests of the African continent and the global south generally. The country’s foreign policy lustre was dimmed by what emerged to be a transactional foreign policy under the leadership of former president Jacob Zuma. The country developed friends in places where little concurrence exists between those places and our country’s rights-based agenda. This was possible because at home, the rights-based agenda was also being undermined and debased by rampant corruption that focused on the narrow interests of a patronage network surrounding the then president.

These elections, on the backdrop of Zuma’s departure from government were an opportune moment for various political parties to reimagine and reassert South Africa in the global stage. The voter sees many of the ructions around the world and wonders what South Africa will do about them. The political parties do a disservice to the voter by glossing over global affairs in their manifestos if at all they mention them. This inward-looking approach by our political parties becomes worrisome on the preparedness of South Africa’s political parties to handle complex matters in our changing geopolitical landscape.
Perhaps through continuous engagement from civil society actors and academic institutions, political parties will one day realise how harmful their omission or inconsistent articulation on foreign policy is to the electorate and general public at large. Who are South Africa’s allies in the continent and abroad? What are the changing power shifts and how do they affect South Africa? What is the key global agenda to be championed by a South Africa with a foreign policy outlook anchored on Ubuntu? These questions remain even after interacting with manifestos. They remain because the manifestos have failed to adequately crystallise some areas of contentious relations, institutions and developments in global affairs.

Author

Lukhona Mnguni is a South African political commentator. He holds a Bachelor of Community and Development Studies (cum laude) and an Honours Degree in Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies (cum laude), both from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Mnguni holds an MSc in Africa and International Development from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, supported by funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship. He currently serves as a PhD intern Researcher at Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit in the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Mnguni is an Open Society Foundation – South Africa Democracy Fellow for 2019 and hosts the #ElectionWatchZA2019 desk.
End Notes

1 As reported by GroundUp shortly after the Independent Electoral Commission released combined statistics from its registration weekends in March 2018 and January 2019, respectively. Accessed from: https://www.groundup.org.za/article/voter-registration-rate-down-2014/

2 In South Africa most organisations tend to view youth as people between 18 and 35. This means that the number of youth not registered could be significantly higher with the expanded age range. Accessed from: http://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/News/Over-700-000-new-voters-added-to-the-voters-roll-ahead-of-elections/


4 Andrew Bennett summarised the key agreements from COP 17 while highlighting that the biggest breakthrough were countries agreeing to adopt, as soon as possible, a universal legal agreement on climate change. Accessed from: http://icologie.com/cop17-outocme/


8 The civilians who died were part of peaceful protests by Palestinians who were opposing what DIRCO referred to as “the provocative inauguration of the US Embassy in Jerusalem”. Accessed from: http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2018/isra0514.htm

9 Mmusi Maimane was addressing the Jewish Community at the Sandton Shul in Johannesburg. Accessed from: https://ewn.co.za/2019/04/08/maimane-criticises-dirco-for-downgrading-diplomatic-relations-with-israel


11 The Doha Round has been the biggest marker of the failure of the WTO and indication on the powerlessness of the institution to hold different players accountable in dialogue. Accessed from: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm

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Contact:
FES South Africa
34 Bompas Road
Dunkeld West
Johannesburg

info@fes-southafrica.org
www.fes-southafrica.org