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# ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>BASIC</td>
<td>Brazil, South Africa, India and China</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIT</td>
<td>Bilateral Investment Treaties</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Strategy</td>
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<td>JAP</td>
<td>Joint Action Plan</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership, also referred to as ‘the Partnership’</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDC</td>
<td>Trilateral Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In 2007 the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership (SP) was launched. Aimed at strengthening relations between the two, a number of high-level meetings took place under its rubric. Following the economic crisis of 2008, which is reshaping internal EU country relations as well as its relations with South Africa, and the growing emphasis on South-South solidarity by the Zuma administration; the Strategic Partnership is increasingly under pressure. Given the fluctuating dynamics in the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership this review, undertaken by the SARCHI Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in partnership with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, focuses on understanding what makes this partnership strategic for both the EU and South Africa and how this has evolved as cooperation reaches its first decade (2017).

On the 21-22 July 2016 a workshop was held in Sandton (South Africa), bringing together EU and South African analysts, government officials, civil society and the private sector, to assess the evolution of the Strategic Partnership between the two partners. Given the different perspectives on how these relations are understood and are unfolding, the review of the partnership brings together scholars from both Europe and South Africa to assess engagement on key areas that fall within the scope of the Joint Action Plan (JAP). The analysis has been divided into four key areas: economic (trade and development), politics (foreign policy), security (peacekeeping and peace making) and global governance (multilateralism), with each area addressed from both a South African and European perspective. In addition to these thematic areas the workshop also held a separate session for scholars and practitioners to reflect on the impact and implications of ‘Brexit’, the United Kingdom’s decision (following the referendum on the 23 June 2016) to leave the European Union, on the future of the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership.

This proceedings report reflects some of the arguments and points raised in the workshop as well as the points arising in the discussion sessions. This is based on the cursory thoughts from the presenters on the evolution of the partnership, with each presentation revised and reviewed to form a full journal article to be published as a special issue of the South African Journal of International Affairs (SAJIA) in 2017.
OPENING REMARKS

Presentation to the UJ Seminar on the South African-EU Strategic Partnership
Johannesburg, 21 July 2016

The Programme Coordinator, Professor Chris Landsberg
Ambassador Marcus Cornaro
Distinguished Academics
Ladies and Gentleman

It gives me great pleasure to participate in this workshop titled Reviewing a decade of the South African - European Union Strategic Partnership which provides an exciting opportunity to discuss a relationship that can be described as substantial, broad-based, and innovative, while supporting South Africa’s national priorities.

I am in agreement that it is a relationship that should form part of the curriculum of both academic research as well as scholarly study.

Our Strategic Partnership with the EU is in its 9th year, and the achievements at both an operational, as well as a political level, have been remarkable. We accomplished a number of significant successes as envisaged in our Joint Action Plan, to the mutual benefit of our people. Through the various structured mechanisms, South Africa and the EU have been able to engage in a manner that has ensured concrete deliverables.

STATEMENT

Adv Mohamed Cassimjee, Director: Regional Organisations, DIRCO

Presentation to the UJ Seminar on the South African-EU Strategic Partnership
Johannesburg, 21 July 2016

The Programme Coordinator, Professor Chris Landsberg
Ambassador Marcus Cornaro
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Ladies and Gentleman

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The importance of the Strategic Partnership to South Africa’s national priorities and the National Development Plan (2030) was recognised by President Zuma in his State of the Nation Address in February 2015 in which he states that:

“...countries of the developed North remain important strategic partners for South Africa through which the country is able to advance its national and foreign policy. We have a valuable partnership with the European Union in amongst others, the infrastructure Investment Programme for South Africa valued at approximately 1.8 billion rand“.

In his 2016, State of the Nation address President Zuma further stated that:

“On North-South cooperation, we continued our engagements with the European Union as a bloc, which is our largest trading partner and foreign investor. Over 2 000 EU companies operate within South Africa, creating over 350 000 jobs”.

Regarding the framework for cooperation between South Africa and the EU, the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) signed in 1999, forms the legal basis of the Partnership. The TDCA was the first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) South Africa entered into post-apartheid, and provided South Africa with a foothold into the global economy.

The TDCA covers five areas of cooperation: enhanced political dialogue, cooperation in trade and trade-related areas, economic cooperation, cooperation in policy sectoral dialogues, and development cooperation.

As a result of South Africa and the EU’s common interests, a natural foundation was created for a Strategic Partnership and the adoption of the Joint Action Plan in May 2007. The Joint Action Plan established the basis of the relationship by stating:

“This Partnership underlines the depth and sincerity of our bilateral relations, which have developed into a mutually beneficial true partnership based on equality”.

In order to intensify the relationship through the Joint Action Plan and to build on Article 4 of the TDCA, a platform for Enhanced Political Dialogue was created that forms the very cornerstone of the Strategic Partnership. In this regard, mention is made of the Summit, which provides for the highest level of interaction between the South African Head of State, the Head of the European Council, and the Head of the European Commission.

Of importance is that on 26 February 2016, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, met with her EU counterpart High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, Ms Federica Mogherini, for the Ministerial Political Dialogue.

The successful outcome of the dialogue highlighted the close relationship that exists between South Africa and the EU. The High-Level dialogues between South Africa and the EU also support the Strategic Partnership objective of Enhanced Dialogue and cooperation in Regional, African and Global matters.

Regarding the above mentioned visit the ECDPM stated that:

“...the visit indicates the possibility for collaboration on a wider range of issues”.

“The conditions are in place for both parties to play within a global arena on the African continent, working beyond and with their differences and cooperating on areas of mutual interest and concern”

In May 2016, Ms Helga Schmid met with the former Director-General Ambassador Matjila on global security issues. Furthermore, the Inter-Parliamentary meeting was hosted in Cape Town.
in 2015, and by the EU in Strasbourg in April 2016, which has resulted in a strong working relationship between the two Parliaments.

On Trade and Investment Cooperation the recently signed SADC-EU EPA, which has its genesis in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000, will replace the trade chapter of the TDCA, and will result in greater market access for South Africa.

The EU as a bloc is South Africa’s largest trading partner and largest foreign investor. At present the EU accounts for 77% of South Africa’s total Foreign Direct Investment stock. While over 2000 EU companies operate within South Africa creating over 350 000 jobs and producing value added goods which are exported and contribute substantially to skills development and job creation.

Total trade has grown by 257% since the TDCA was implemented in 2000; increasing from R142 billion in 2000 to R535 billion in 2015. South Africa’s exports and imports with the EU both had an annual growth of about 9% during the period 2011 to 2015, with exports increasing from R151 billion in 2011 to R216 billion in 2015. However, the trade balance continues to grow wider in favour of EU and challenges South Africa’s aim of reaching balanced trade.

On development cooperation, South Africa has also been a beneficiary of development assistance from the EU through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). In support of this programme the EU has formally committed €241 million for the period 2014-2020 under the DCI to assist South Africa to address the eradication of poverty, create employment, education, training, and innovation and building a capable and developmental state.

In respect of this Sectoral Cooperation, the Dialogues are functioning well on a technical level. The Strategic Partnership includes over twenty sectoral policy dialogues, covering diverse issues including development cooperation, science and technology, space, communications, migration, health, trade, education and skills development, peace and security and human rights.

In addition, the TDCA Dialogue Facility, is a mechanism used to promote dialogue and cooperation between the South African Government Departments and their EU counterparts in the above mentioned sectoral programmes. From 2009 - 2015, 46 projects to the value of €7 million were implemented across 21 Government Departments. At present a bridging phase programme of €1.3 million is being rolled-out for 2016. The next Dialogue Facility programme of €5 million, which will be operational over the next 5 years, is being finalised for launch after September 2016.

On infrastructure development it is important to note the Infrastructure Investment Programme for South Africa (IIIPSA). The IIIPSA programme is worth €1 million (approximately R1.8 billion) developed jointly by the South African Government and the EU, and when fully implemented will go a long way in unlocking infrastructure backlogs, not only in South Africa but also in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, thus contributing to strengthening regional integration and economic growth.

Furthermore, the European Investment Bank has also been playing an important role in supporting South Africa’s national priorities. Since 1995, the Bank has provided a total of over €2.8 billion (R46 billion) of loans to South African public and private borrowers.

In 2015, €200 million (R3.3 billion) was provided in the form of medium to long term credit lines for South African Small and Medium Enterprises and companies through financial institutions.

As we look forward towards the future of the relationship between South Africa and the EU, as a centre for knowledge, high-end skills, technology and innovation in which it has a comparative advantage, the EU will become an even more important partner in the developmental trajectory of South Africa.
GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS

Most of today’s challenges are global challenges. We are finally realising we can only tackle them together, in partnership.

We have started working on something new: diplomacy, the power of soft power, and strategic partnerships. Think of the deal we reached with Iran. Think of the Paris conference on climate change, or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We have shown the world that we must move beyond an era of blocs - North against South, East against West.

South Africa understands this very well. South Africa looks at the world from a privileged point of view. An industrialised country in the Southern hemisphere. A member of both the Group of 20 and the G77. It is not by chance that South Africa’s chairmanship of the G77+China Group was crucial for the success of both COP21 and the SDGs. Countries like South Africa are key in building bridges between various groups and organisations. Different challenges might call for different formats.
In a more cooperative world order, alliances cannot be mutually exclusive. A wider and deeper network of partnerships - and regional alliances - can only facilitate our work for peace worldwide.

This is the framework for the EU strategic partnership, and the framework for the EU-SA Strategic Partnership.

The EU has just adopted a Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy. This is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a Strategy. We need a shared vision, and common action. And this is even more true after the British referendum. Only together we can respond to the threats and seize the opportunities the world offers. “Global” is not just intended in a geographical sense: it also refers to the wide array of policies and instruments the European Union has, and can use. The Strategy focuses on defence capabilities and anti-terrorism as much as on job opportunities, inclusive societies and human rights. It is about soft power. But in today’s world soft power and hard power have to go hand in hand. Specifically, on Africa - The Global Strategy establishes that the EU will pursue State and Societal Resilience to our East and South; Cooperative Regional Orders; and a Peaceful and Prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa. The strategy does not elaborate extensively on Africa. It is a reminder that we should not take our partnership for granted, but that we need to continuously deepen the partnership making best use of the opportunities we have.

EU-SOUTH AFRICA

Since the day that Nelson Mandela walked as a free man in 1990, Europe and South Africa have seen rapidly increased cooperation, culminating in the establishment in 2007 of the Strategic Partnership, a forward-looking platform that facilitates the wide ranging cooperation between the European Union and South Africa. As explained by my friend Cassimjee, a variety of dialogues between the EU and South Africa allow us to share experiences in areas of common interest, or where we face common challenges.

Successful areas of cooperation include sciences and technology, innovation, education, health, energy, the environment, macro-economic policies, human rights and peace and security. Our partnership is broad and comprehensive and covers political, trade and development interests.

Next year we will be celebrating the 10th anniversary of our Strategic Partnership. It’s time to look at the “Deliverables” of our Partnership and to look forward. There are many fields where our cooperation can fortify.

MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

In a changing global order, all pathways towards a more cooperative and multilateral setting should be explored. South Africa and the EU used to be like-minded and share positions in the multilateral fora. However, South Africa and the EU are becoming “increasingly less like-minded”. This is particularly relevant in the area of Human Rights, at the core of both South Africa and the EU’s foreign affairs policy. It makes perfect sense for a country like South Africa to diversify its partners around the world. Europe cannot be jealous about this. At the same time, diversification should not compromise the defence of the strong values South Africa stands for and its progressive Constitution. The EU appreciates the opportunities that our SA-EU Strategic Partnership offers to share views, and understand where we are coming from, even when we disagree. New friendships should not exclude that old-time friendships keep getting deeper.

Areas where there is potential to deepen our cooperation are: trade/EPAs, employability, macro-economy issues, public finance management, cooperation on illicit flows in addition to peace and security.
FORMAT OF THE PARTNERSHIP

After 10 years in the partnership it is time to assess if the format is right, if the format allows for the necessary flexibility to benefit from the opportunities the Partnership offers including contacts at all levels, or whether it is rather a stringent mechanism that precludes opportunities. And it is our view that the format should respond to our ambitions and aspirations for future cooperation. Look at our cooperation with Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya; where without a Strategic Partnership, we meet at Presidential level on a regular basis.

10 years into the Partnership, we also want to reflect on the perception of the EU in South Africa, and if our generation has the capacity to move from the perception of the “European communities” in the South Africa specific historical background, to an EU that is a catalyst for social inclusion, that addresses racism and xenophobia both in Europe and South Africa in a determined way.

The EU and South Africa will need to stand shoulder to shoulder facing the challenges and aspirations we share. United in diversity: this is the motto of our European Union. That is the principle enshrined in South Africa’s Constitution: “That South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.” Making these words come true is our common challenge, the task ahead, the deepest reason for our partnership. Our partnership is designed for this.

DISCUSSION

A question was raised on the idea of exporting values and it was indicated that the EU does not have a clear set of values and that this is an area of foreign policy that needs further evaluation. Concerns were also raised on the EU’s declining development cooperation to South Africa.

Discussion then turned to the newly adopted EU Global Strategy with its focus on balancing hard power with soft power, especially when it comes to security. It was questioned whether attention had been given to maritime security cooperation, particularly against piracy. It was also noted that the EU continues to support the African Peace Facility (20% of contributions are from the EU). Given the ongoing concerns around peace and security, questions were raised on how best to concretize security relations. It was pointed out that there has been engagement between the EU and South Africa around the talks on Syria, Palestine and the EU’s support for South African special envoys and South Africa’s own involvement in J AES. Despite this, it was felt that security issues have been missing in the SP.

Within the discussion session, the South African position on ‘unity in diversity’ was highlighted, with the EU project also adopting this approach in bringing member-states together. Both were also facing the challenges of migration, although it was highlighted that the impacts are felt differently. In considering the future of the SP, it was questioned whether the partnership would not become frustrated if difficult issues were not discussed.
In building an understanding of the SP in terms of economics, trade and development, the discussion began by noting that the EU is selective in its partnership, with only 10 strategic partners identified. The EU-South Africa SP is based on both facts and emotions which has both mutual expectations and frustrations. The fault lines in the discussions between the partners is that South Africa has a dual economy, in other words engaging an economy that is capable of international trade but that is also underdeveloped. There are 2 strands to the dialogue: one that considers bilateral trade and investment, and a second that considers bilateral cooperation projects and the role of South Africa in Africa development cooperation.

It was further noted that from an EU perspective, South Africa is not seen as a gateway to Africa. Indeed, many EU countries are closer to North and West Africa than South Africa is geographically. Nevertheless, it was also pointed out that South Africa’s position in Africa is beneficial for the EU, particularly on development. However, in terms of trade elements, South Africa’s relationships within the African continent are causing challenges for the EU. This is as a result of the tensions around trade following the negotiations of the EPA’s. Concern was further raised around the governance of trade and FDI within South Africa by the EU noting the failure to renew the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). Questions were further raised in that while the BITs were no longer negotiated with the EU, they were being negotiated by South Africa with China.

On Official Development Assistance (ODA), the discussions on providing aid to the so-called ‘emerging powers’ continues within the EU, although the focus has shifted to considerations of where EU assistance can make the most difference. It is argued that ODA can make a bigger difference elsewhere on the continent. Even in the context of Trilateral Development Cooperation (TDC) it was argued that there is suspicion from the EU that it is funding South Africa’s foreign policy rather than being primarily a development interaction. Yet despite this, South Africa remains an attractive partner particularly in its multilateral institution building and that it has positioned itself as a geo-political country of the South.

It was also argued that the tensions on trade and FDI should not be seen as unique to the EU-South Africa SP, as for instance, there are also challenges in the EU-Indian SP. It was further argued that middle income countries were specifically chosen for a SP because it is where the EU can expand its markets. SPs debunk the myth that values are an important part of the SP, this is demonstrated in both SPs with China and Russia.

For South Africa, the SP helps South Africa bolster its visibility in the international sphere, raising the profile of South Africa to EU companies. South Africa has benefitted
from these ties, but the EU also has interests in the country with a number of its own corporates represented. The problem was raised that the EPAs and the BITs both contribute towards undermining the SP.

DISCUSSION

When it comes to the negotiations around the EPA agreements, the EU acknowledged South Africa's role, although concern was expressed around its impact on regionalisation. This concerns the different regional groupings under the EPAs and those of the existing regional organisations.

It was noted that there have been ongoing discussions on the citrus black spot issue, where there has been good engagement on this. It is in such instances that the value of the SP comes to the fore.
In the second session of discussion, the focus turned to political engagement and the focus of foreign policy. Here the discussion noted that the development of an EU identity as an international actor, coincided with the emergence of a distinct foreign policy. SPs emerged as a policy tool to confront newly perceived security issues. The idea of a strategic partnership is that it offers flexibility in dealing with the issues of a multipolar world. As the EU adapts to being an international actor, so too must its foreign policy. The release of the new Global Strategy highlights a shift in the EU’s approach to development cooperation, as well as an intention to extend partnerships.

From a South African perspective, political engagements were identified as ‘lukewarm’ following a variety of disagreements. South Africa is looking to Africa and developing its own approach to development and security. Trilateral Development Cooperation (TDC) is a way in which the EU and South Africa can collaborate to engage in areas where it would otherwise be difficult to build relations. The SP further provides a platform to raise issues like the World Trade Organization or the mega-regional trade agreements.

DISCUSSION

With the move towards adopting the new Global Strategy, a question was raised around the role of the EU in addressing the changing international dynamics. In the absence of any mention of the strategic partnerships in the Global Strategy, it was noted that the SP is not a guarantor of engagement, and that further action would be needed in building on the partnership. The division between strategic interest and partnerships in the Global Strategy of the EU was pointed out as more explicit on EU interests than previous documents. For example, it was noted that there is a focus on development in serving EU interests.

The discussion further pointed out that while on paper common positions are distinguished, there are questions around whether there has been any real convergence between partners in multilateral fora. Discussions on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations were pointed out as an example, which continue to be clouded by secrecy.

It was also noted that the cooperation between the EU and South Africa could be used to facilitate civil society participation on global issues. An expanded engagement to include thinking from civil society is needed, as there is a richness of input from both South Africa and the EU on cooperation, where shared concerns over global issues could be used to revitalise the dialogue. There does, however, need to be a conversation on people, history, and ideas, and the need to acknowledge that
values change, and to start by agreeing on principles. Questions raised on technical issues should be used as a bridge to a discussion on politics, which is missing in current narrative on SPs, resulting in a ‘clunky conversation’. Currently there seems to be a divide between politics and economics.

From left: Ambassador Brigitte Öppinger Walchshofer, Austrian Representative; Ms Renate Tenbusch, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Representative; Ambassador Marcus Cornaro, European Union Representative; Advocate Mohammed Cassimjee, Representative Department of International Relations and Cooperation; Dr Lesley Masters, University of Johannesburg; Prof Chirs Landsberg, University of Johannesburg.
In the final panel of the first day a discussion was held on the 2016 Brexit decision, following the UK’s referendum, and considering the future outlook for South Africa and Africa more broadly. Short inputs from participants led the discussion that followed. It was pointed out that the context in which the debate played out in the UK should be taken into account as the narratives of the campaign affected the vote and its outcome. The ‘Leave’ campaigners’ claims on finance to the EU, the need for the UK to deal with socio-economic issues, and the rhetoric around immigration and foreigners was not subject to regulation around facts. This was problematic, and the truth was seen to be constructed. Indeed, this applied particularly to the ‘Leave’ campaign’s position on the National Health Service (NHS) and its funding problems, which formed a central narrative. The campaign also targeted the numbers of Eastern Europeans without any basis.

It was pointed out that there is still no indication of what or how a deal between the EU and the UK will be framed, or what the UK’s position is going to be entering into these negotiations. What is evident is the frustrations from the people as the promises set out by the ‘Leave’ campaign are shown to be misleading. The divide between ‘passion politics’ and technical politics was clearly evident in the campaign, as was the divide in the approach between politics and economics.

Participants in the panel indicated that the focus for the UK would now turn to whether to stay in the common market or not, while domestically there are concerns that the Labour Party is becoming increasingly weak, risking a political vacuum if it were to collapse. It was argued that as part of the common market, the UK would still have to pay into the EU and allow for the free movement of people, but London would not have the same ability to influence the EU. It was further noted that any action on the referendum would only take place only in 2017. It was pointed out that while there has been considerable attention given to policy-making, there is little known about ‘policy disentangling’. Concern was raised about the impact of Brexit on development cooperation, where the UK pays a large contribution to the EU budget, and what would happen to certain projects if money is therefore withdrawn.

Panellists further noted that the outcome of the referendum is the result of a sustained level of negativity towards the EU by the UK. Given this position, it was pointed out that some analysts have argued it would be better for the EU and UK to part ways, as without the UK there is the possibility of a more integrated EU. The UK, too, now has an opportunity to ‘re-set’ its relations with the EU. On a cautionary note it was highlighted that one possible outcome from the UK’s exit could also be the emergence
of right wing populism in Europe. A lesson learnt from the Brexit vote is that on the ground people are feeling left behind or that they have lost out. There is a sense of inequality that has not been addressed at the grass-roots level, giving rise to a need to challenge the idea that the EU is sacrosanct, particularly given the perceptions of a disconnect between the people and the bureaucrats. There is also a strong sense that there is a democratic deficit in the EU and now a need for reflection within the EU, something that could be said about all regional integration projects. Given the challenge to the EU’s own regional integration project, there was an opportunity to re-visit regional integration between the states of Africa, whose borders are much more porous and integrated than in the case of the EU.

It was argued by Panelists that the UK decision to leave the EU should also be seen within the context of the British culture and the geography of the island. This is also deeply linked to identity politics in the UK, and UK-US relations. What Brexit may bring is a renewed focus on the Commonwealth, particularly as it seems that in the UK people know more about India than they do about Salzburg.

It was further pointed out during the discussion that the Brexit vote did not reflect a mass consensus, as the 'Leave' vote was won by a small margin. The profile of the voters was noted, particularly in terms of their education and demographics. Questions were also raised on the impact of globalisation on the Brexit vote and what lessons could be drawn from this referendum. In the case of South Africa, it was highlighted that the UK remains a traditional partner, and has played a role in trade, FDI and job creation. Concerns was raised on how to now relate to the UK, which will be outside of the EPAs. This will require new trade arrangements. It was noted that South Africa’s own approach towards the outcomes of the election had been ‘cool headed’ compared to the response from other countries, including initial reactions from India, Brazil, and the US.

The discussion pointed out that for the EU, a change needs to happen in the narrative, as well as in popular engagement, rather than solely at the constitutional level. Attention now needs to turn to ensuring an exit strategy that not only satisfies both parties, but also shows the advantages of staying in the EU. It would also be worthwhile to revisit the impact of the wealth gap, and question the role of neo-liberal globalisation. It was argued that there is a need to move towards a fairer world. The EEC started as a functional peace movement, in the next phase it adopted a Keynesian model, and then in a new iteration became a neo-liberal project driven by economic concerns. Caution was, however, expressed on the role of the Commonwealth, with its historical context of privilege and power structure. It was also indicated that the process and outcomes of the Brexit referendum is an area that needs further analysis, particularly against the experiences of other referendums (such as the 1963 referendum in South Africa), and the impact of social media.
When it comes to peace and security it was indicated that while there was not a specific focus on cooperation in the SP, there is nevertheless participation on peace and security particularly at the continental level. It was argued that the EU security strategy is designed with Africa in mind, in its focus on regional security, extremism, state failure, and the relationship between development and security. There is also a focus on human security, a concept that South Africa also gives prominence. Given both partners’ on the continent, there is the potential to do much more in terms of cooperation in addressing regional conflict.

When it comes to the SP an unintended consequence was highlighted in that there are those countries identified by the EU as SPs compared to those actors that are considered strategic partners in terms of peace and security. In the main, cooperation has however been at the continental level rather than through SP. With EU global Strategy now explicit about threats such as terrorism, concern was raised on the inclusion of peace and security as a substantive part of the SP.

The SP itself does not provide much in the way of detail on peace and security and (given its nature) there is not much available on how these relations unfold. In addition there is a need to further assess how both partners approach peace and security and the relation of national interests to this.

It was pointed out that while the SP Joint Action Plan (JAP) provides the basis for the partnership, values and interests have shifted while the JAP has remained static. There is a need to see that it is more beneficial to be in a strategic partnership than not. Relations between South Africa and the EU on peace and security have come under pressure, particularly on the different perceptions on Libya, Zimbabwe, and Sudan.

DISCUSSION
The discussion session pointed out that there were a number of ‘low hanging fruit’ when it comes to working together on questions of peace and security, but this has not been pursued. There has never been a genuine attempt to jointly plan or execute strategies on peace and security, and that there has been more disharmony that the seizing of opportunities. On the question of Zimbabwe there has been an underperformance of the SP, but this is an area of opportunity in building cooperation. It was also argued that the reason why the partners could not find a commonly shared approach between Africa and the West is because there has been an avoidance
in building a common international strategy on Zimbabwe. Finding a resolution on this has essentially been postponed internationally, but this is an issue area where South Africa and the EU could seize the opportunity to break the impasse.

Beyond conflict situations in Africa, both parties could move towards a mature relationship, where the SP could be used as a platform for 'a meeting of minds' on conflicts in Syria, Iran, and Palestine. A question was raised which considered the reasons why this opportunity has never been seized upon, and whether it is a result of ambivalence, suspicions, or ideological reasons. This needs to be addressed.

For the EU, the new Global Strategy gives emphasis to the global environment as well as a wide set of instruments for foreign affairs policy, including a global human security approach, which tied the EU to South Africa in terms of geographical coverage. This includes both regional and multilateral perspectives. The idea of human security is, however, a complex area where there needs be an agreement on a definition and how it may consequently fit into the Strategic Partnership. It also raises the question of new security threats.

It was re-emphasised that the EU and South Africa do share values, but do not always agree on substance. However, there are complementarities such as on the question of Palestine that can be addressed. Questions were however raised on whether there is any incentive to deepen the focus on peace and security in the partnership. Here it was posited that all the EU’s strategic partnerships have an element focused on peace and security, although in some cases it is not clear how this will be implemented. The case of the SP with Mexico was highlighted in this regard. It was also argued that when it comes to the EU-South Africa SP, there is a lot of disconnect between bureaucratic levels and political levels.

Dr Toni Haastrup, University of Kent.
In the final panel of the workshop, the discussion turned to the SP and global governance. Here the climate change negotiations were used in assessing how the EU and South Africa have engaged within multilateral forums and the contribution of the EU-SA SP. It was pointed out that the EU is multilateral by nature and vocation, with effective multilateralism preferred as a mode of engagement, but remains ambiguous on how effective it has been. It was also noted that both partners approach multilateralism from different perspectives, which has meant that there has not always been the scope for the SP to play a role in multilateral forums.

Climate change as part of the SP has been included since 2007. In considering the developments of the SP within multilateral negotiations, the session noted that during the UNFCCC COP15 (Copenhagen 2009), the SP was undermined as the BASIC countries and the US pushed through an agreement. The EU subsequently invested more time in climate diplomacy as well as the strengthening of bilateral relations on climate change. There has also been a more specific focus on areas such as finance, cooperation, and development. South Africa is a key partner in Africa, and acts as bridge between developed and developing countries, and also shares values with the EU.

By COP21, and the Paris agreement, it was noted that South Africa had played a role in breaking down tensions within these negotiations, and that the EU and Africa group played a joint role in bringing the negotiations together. There have been numerous meetings between parliamentarians and ministries on issues of climate change, and this is the level where the SP has been gaining traction, even though it is not formal. The challenge is that there are different people and different departments involved when it comes to bilateral and multilateral and multilateral relations.

While there is evidence to suggest that the SP may have provided the platform to enhance engagement between partners in the multilateral climate change negotiations, this has not always been the case across other areas of global governance. Within the summit discussion, in addition to collaboration on climate change, the G20, the UN, and the Post-2015 Development Agenda were areas highlighted for engagement through the SP. It was argued that there is further scope to discuss the role of the SP within multilateral forums as this has not been strategically approached.
DISCUSSION

Questions were asked concerning South Africa’s role on the international stage, and whether Pretoria still occupied a position as a ‘Middle Power/Emerging Middle Power’. The question of what motivated the relationship with the EU was also raised, and whether the SP was in effect ‘just a piece of paper’. It was however pointed out that given the resources invested in the SP, there was a level of commitment to the partnership.

Whether South Africa can legitimately claim to represent Africa in the climate change negotiations, was a point raised, particularly as regards the question of emissions where South Africa stands out from the rest of Africa. In addition, countries like the DRC are increasingly important for such an agreement because of their forest resources. Concern was raised on the potential for incoherence in foreign policy between bilateral and multilateral roles, and how when it came to coordination and cooperation, government departments within the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership worked together.

Aspirations to do more in multilateral forums drives the SP, evident in the emphasis that both partners place on it. However, the question is how to use the SP within multilateral settings to build mutually reinforcing relations. The example of the 2016 CITES conference in South Africa was used as an example, where although not part of the SP, the momentum gained from these negotiations could be used in SP further.
Thursday, 21 July 2016

09h00 - 09h30  Arrival and Registration

09h30 - 09h45  Welcome:
Professor Chris Landsberg  
SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy & Foreign Policy,  
University of Johannesburg

Opening Remarks:
Renate Tenbusch  
Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

09h45 - 10h00  Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)  
Address:
Advocate M. Cassimjee  
Director: Regional Organisations, Department of  
International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)

10h00 - 10h15  Head of the European Union Delegation to South Africa  
Address:
Ambassador Marcus Cornaro  
Head of the EU Delegation to the Republic of South Africa

10h15 - 10h30  Tea/Coffee
10h30 - 12h00 PANEL 1: THE EU-SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT

EU-South Africa partnership - Waning affection, persistent interests
Speaker: Dr Sven Grimm
paper co-authored with Dr Christine Hackenesch, Bilateral and Multilateral Development Cooperation, German Development Institute (DIE)

Relations between South Africa and the European Union: The End of a Strategic Partnership?
Speaker: Prof Mzukisi Qobo, University of Johannesburg
Paper co-authored with Prof Mills Soko, Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town

Q & A
Chair: Catherine Grant Makokera, Tutwa Consulting

12h00 - 13h00 Lunch

13h00 - 14h30 PANEL 2: THE EU-SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: FOREIGN POLICY

Refurbishing the EU’s Foreign Policy Instrument of Strategic Partnerships: The Example of the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership
Speaker: Dr Anna Stahl, Institute for European Studies (IES), Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

Recalibrating South Africa’s relations with the EU: Still Strategic?
Speaker: Dr Philani Mthembu, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) associated with UNISA

Q & A
Chair: Prof Chris Landsberg, SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy & Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg

14h30 Tea/Coffee

14h15 - 16h30 PANEL 3: BREXIT: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICA

Chair: Prof Chris Landsberg, SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy & Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg

Open discussion

16h30 Conclusion of Day 1

Dr Lesley Masters & Dr Lara Hierro
SARChI Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg

17h00 Networking Event

Please join us for refreshments, and an opportunity to engage further with the authors and participants.

Venue: Main Station 1, Radisson Blu Gautrain Hotel, Sandton
DAY 2:
Workshop on the EU - South Africa Strategic Partnership

Thursday, 22 July 2016

09h00 - 09h30  Arrival and Registration

09h30 - 11h00  PANEL 4: THE EU-SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: PEACE AND SECURITY

South Africa as Regional Partner in EU Peace and Security Aspirations in Africa
Speaker: Dr Toni Hasstrup, University of Kent

Short term interest, long term perspectives: Balancing SA’s peace and security in the EU-SA Strategic Partnership
Speaker: Dr Lara Hierro
SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy & Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg

Q & A
Chair: Dr John Kotsopoulos, Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria

11h00 - 11h15  Tea/Coffee

11h15 - 12h45  PANEL 5: THE EU-SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The South Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership and Global Environmental Governance: Effective Multilateralism after Copenhagen?
Speaker: Dr Camilla Adelle
Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria

The EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership: A strategic bilateral partnership in multilateral fora?
Speaker: Dr Lesley Masters
SARChI Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg

Q & A
Chair: Prof David Hornsby
International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand
Conclusion of the Workshop and Next Steps:

Vote of Thanks: Dr Lesley Masters  
SARChI Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,  
University of Johannesburg

13h00 Lunch

Departure of Guests
The NRF SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy is a research and postgraduate research and teaching initiative under the aegis of the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Johannesburg. It seeks to respond to the fluctuating state of Africa’s international affairs by developing a research and outreach agenda embedded in strong basic and applied primary research.

The NRF SARChI Chair is committed to engaging in research that bridges the divide between the worlds of theory and practice/decision making. It adopts an interdisciplinary approach on the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy, and implements a multi-dimensional research agenda, comprising a focus on South African foreign policy; African diplomacy; African integration at continental, regional and sub-regional levels; and Africa’s cooperation with, and search for strategic partnerships with the outside world.

In terms of diplomacy, the emphasis of our work is on investigating the dimensions of African peace and security, development and stability, a continental development agenda, and Africa's international cooperation. This includes issues such as the national challenge of honing and refining South Africa's national interests within its 'African Agenda'; and, the continental challenge of researching Africa's inter-state and international relations with a view to enhancing African agency on the world stage.

The Chair's vision of being "a Pan-African research and post-graduate development centre of international repute engaging in African challenges through rigorous research in diplomacy and foreign policy" is being gradually borne out through the work of the Chair-holder, Professor Chris Landsberg, and his team at the Centre.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) shares a long common history with the African National Congress (ANC) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

From the 1980s FES supported not only the ANC in exile but also its liaison office in the then West-Germany. Within South Africa FES gave its support to the nascent black trade union movement mainly through university-based labour support organisations. Towards the late eighties the FES also facilitated dialogue between the opposition in exile and reform oriented quarters within the white establishment.

The FES was able to open in 1991 its first official office in Cape Town, which was subsequently moved to Johannesburg in 1993. Dialogue and consultation but also capacity building was offered by the FES to assist in the process of political transformation and to prepare the ANC for future government.

Before and after the 1994 elections the FES contributed with research and capacity building to the constitution-making process. Simultaneously the FES offered training and advice to the South African trade unions.

In the area of international relations FES was instrumental in setting up a new policy think tank, the “Institute of Global Dialogue” (IGD). The IGD was designed to analyse key issues confronting South Africa and southern Africa in mercurial international environment and to develop appropriate strategies for them.

Up to the present, the FES works in close cooperation with the ANC, COSATU and different civil society organisations for a better socio-economic development and for gender equality in South Africa and with the IGD on issues of international concern.